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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how different models of sociality can contribute to a 
better understanding of the dynamics of knowledge sharing within different 
organizational settings. It is asserted that the dynamics of knowledge 
sharing is organized according to a mix of four relational models 
distinguished by the relation models theory (Fiske, 1991). It is described 
how each of these models (communal sharing, authority ranking, equality 
matching and market pricing) have their own implications for 
understanding and supporting the knowledge sharing process. What model 
of social relations is in use, is influenced by cultural implementation rules, 
the kind of activity with its division of labor and the characteristics of 
knowledge being shared and technologies being used. By knowing 
according to what relational model(s) knowledge is being shared, one can 
better understand and consequently better facilitate the organizational and 
technical conditions for sharing knowledge (and vice versa).  
 
  2 
1. Introduction 
 
 It is generally agreed upon that knowledge sharing is a crucial process within 
organizational settings, whether these are for example project teams, formal work groups 
or communities of practice. One might even argue that sharing knowledge is the reason 
d’être of such organizational settings. After all, due to the division of labor and 
accompanying fragmentation, specialization and distribution of knowledge, it becomes a 
requisite to integrate and thus share the diversity of complementary knowledge in order to 
produce complex products and services. An organizational setting has just been implemen-
ted or has emerged since none of the actors involved could produce the collective outcome 
individually. 
 Many practitioners and academics assume that since knowledge sharing is so important, 
people will share all the required knowledge without problems. However, many companies 
and institutions have experienced that the reality is somewhat different. Textbox 1 
describes the situation of organizations dealing with repetitive work trying to develop 
knowledge repositories in order to share their best practices. Textbox 2 addresses the 
implementation of communities within and between organizations in order to share 
knowledge among peers. Both examples are commonly encountered in many organizations 
but also indicate that knowledge sharing is not obvious in practice, whether a codified 
strategy (e.g. best practices) or a personalized strategy (e.g. communities) has been 
followed (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999). 
 Hitherto, research has suggested a number of individual factors that may influence this 
lack of knowledge sharing. One explanation that has received much attention in literature 
is the epistemological impossibility to articulate all knowledge people have (Baalen, 2002). 
It is now accepted that we know more than we can tell (Polanyi, 1983). Besides cognitive 
limits, other individual factors include efficiency rationales, a lack of ‘who-knows-what’ 
and the feeling of ‘not-invented-here’. Also several organizational factors have been 
identified in literature that restrict knowledge sharing. Examples of these factors are: an 
organizational culture that discourages knowledge sharing; the lack of (billable) time to 
contribute to both knowledge repositories and community activity; badly defined 
objectives for sharing knowledge; and the fact that technologies supposed to facilitate 
knowledge sharing are not appropriate. A third set of explaining factors is derived from the 
knowledge being shared. For example its codifiability, equivocality or heterogeneity 
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influences the knowledge sharing process considerably. 
 
Textbox 1 Developing best practices and using groupware technology 
 
 In an increasing competitive environment, organizations need to operate as efficiently as 
possible, especially when they are dealing with repetitive work (e.g., doing similar 
consultancy assignments, processing insurance claims or developing software). Since 
these organizations employ people who all have acquired particular knowledge in practice, 
it seems rational to try to benefit from this knowledge, so that every employee can take 
advantage of prior experiences of their colleagues. It would be inefficient to let people 
‘reinvent the wheel’ every time. Therefore organizations have tried to set up knowledge 
repositories that contain best practices and other knowledge that could be of interest for 
other employees. Rationally most people subscribe the usefulness of such knowledge 
systems. However, in practice many repositories remained ‘empty’ since the employees did 
not contribute to the accumulation of knowledge in the database.  
 Not only within organizations dealing with repetitive work, but also within globally 
distributed projects one faces situations where technologies for sharing knowledge are not 
used as intended. Although groupware technology can support transforming the workflow of 
a project into a text and make it visible to everyone involved in the project, the database 
frequently remains rather incomplete due to the unwillingness of the project members to 
contribute to the project repository (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996). 
 
 However, as Granovetter (Granovetter, 1982) has argued, neither an undersocialized 
perspective of individuals acting in isolation nor an oversocialized view of individuals 
obedient to norms and culture is adequate to explain behavior. Both the under- and 
oversocialized perspectives of knowledge sharing, as well as the combination of the two, 
neglect an important additional consideration: the social relationships among actors. This is 
an important omission because knowledge sharing is a fundamentally social phenomenon. 
Knowledge sharing involves a relationship between actors that is also embedded in a 
structure of other social relationships. These ongoing social relationships provide the 
constraints and opportunities that, in combination with characteristics of individuals, 
organizations and knowledge, may help explain the dynamics of knowledge sharing in 
organizations. In this paper an embedded perspective is adopted where individuals are 
considered to interact and share knowledge within a network of social relations.  
 Knowledge sharing behavior is generally explained by just one model of social 
relations. Whereas some people, for example, assume that people share knowledge without 
expecting anything in return, others argue that people only share knowledge when they are 
being paid for it or acquire prestige. Also textboxes 1 and 2 indicate that there exist 
different social principles according to which people do or do not share knowledge. The 
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relation models theory (Fiske, 1991) postulates that human relations may be based largely 
on combinations of four relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality 
matching and market pricing. By taking these four relational models into account as 
mechanisms behind knowledge sharing, rather than just one, it is asserted that the 
understanding of knowledge sharing might improve. The objective of this paper is to 
explore how these four models of social relations can contribute to a better understanding 
of the dynamics of knowledge sharing within different organizational settings. 
 
Textbox 2 Implementing communities 
 
 The last two decennia, a whole range of organizations have reorganized themselves 
into team-based organizations, since there was widespread agreement that multi-
disciplinary working was essential in the new competitive environment (Orlikowski, Yates, 
Okamura, & Fujimoto, 1995). While moving from a functionally based company, where 
experts were located amongst others with similar backgrounds and interests, to one based 
on project teams, they found out that much cross-fertilization of ideas within disciplines 
were lost (Blackler, Crump, & McDonald, 1999). An increasing number of organizations 
have tried to solve their problem by creating communities as a way of maintaining connec-
tions with peers, continuing the abilities of specialists to work at the forefront of their own 
fields (Wenger, 1998). Appealing historic examples (Orr, 1990; Wenger & Snyder, 2000) 
probably have contributed to the desire of many organizations to implement similar 
communities within or between organizational settings. Although communities benefit from 
cultivation (Wenger & Snyder, 2000), their fundamentally informal and self-organizing 
nature makes a simple managerial implementation almost impossible (management 
paradox). And indeed, in practice many organizations are struggling with facilitating 
communities and the expected advantages for the knowledge sharing process do not 
always come off. 
 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, it is described how knowledge 
sharing implies a kind of social relation between individuals. Then, the four elementary 
models of social relations as brought forward by the relation models theory (Fiske, 1991) 
are described. Consequently, the implications of these four models for the knowledge 
sharing process are explained, followed by a description of the cultural implementation 
rules. The next section describes how an infoculture is derived from the relational models 
and how they reveal themselves in different organizational settings. When people interact 
according to different relational models or when the assumed relational model of a 
technology or organizational setting is not consistent with the relational model in use, 
social conflicts will occur as is described next. The paper concludes with some 
summarizing remarks. 
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2. Knowledge sharing and social relations 
 
 In the introduction it has been stated that knowledge sharing is a fundamentally social 
phenomenon. ‘Social behavior is inherently relational in nature: individual behavior 
assumes social meaning only in the context of human relations. The basic unit of analysis 
is therefore not individual behavior, but behavior-in-a-relational context (Fiske, 1991). 
Knowledge sharing always implies a particular kind of relationship between at least two 
actors. These actors can refer both to human beings and technologies. In the first situation 
knowledge is being shared between human beings interacting face-to-face, or mediated by 
technology both synchronous and asynchronous. In the second situation the technology can 
act as an intelligent machine (e.g. chess computer) or as an passive knowledge repository 
(e.g. encyclopedia). It is not necessary that the 'other persons' be present or even exist – 
nor, if they do exist, that they actually perceive the action or perceive it as it was intended. 
A social relationship exists when any person acts under the implicit assumption that they 
are interacting with reference to imputedly shared meanings. 
 The knowledge sharing process has fascinated researchers within a diversity of social 
disciplines, like philosophy, sociology, cognitive psychology, management science and 
economics. Within their own domain, each discipline has contributed to the understanding 
of knowledge sharing by providing different theoretical perspectives and accompanying 
theories. From this theoretical diversity different approaches for under-standing the 
knowledge sharing process have emerged. 
 Knowledge sharing behavior is frequently explained as the product of an individual 
calculus of benefits and costs. People are assumed to strive to optimize or maximize the 
ratio of expected benefits to costs, risks or effort incurred. In this framework, all 
knowledge sharing behavior is seen as merely a means to the ultimate goal of long-run 
realization of individual self-interest. Knowledge is considered as a commodity that is 
being shared as a function of market prices or utilities. Not only economists (e.g. 
transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1975)) have taken these assumptions as their 
core axioms, but also other social scientists have taken them for granted as implicit 
assumptions. 
 However, self-interest realization is not the unique nor paramount motive for 
knowledge sharing behavior. Rather than assuming that humans are by nature (asocial) 
individualists, the idea that people are fundamentally social, almost altruistic is another 
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common idea. This can be illustrated by the emergence of communities, which has 
received an increasing interest recently. The assumption underlying an ‘ideal’ community 
is that people freely share knowledge where they can, without keeping a scorecard of their 
gains and losses. This assumption about knowledge sharing is dominant within most 
current knowledge sharing initiatives. However, practice shows that the assumptions of 
this approach are not valid in all organizational settings (see textboxes 1 and 2). 
 Usually, only one approach of social relations is taken into account for understanding 
knowledge sharing. Davenport, for example, primarily relates to the first approach while 
labeling the second as unrealistic: ‘Many knowledge initiatives have been based on the 
utopian assumption that knowledge moves without friction or motivation force, that people 
will share knowledge with no concern for what they may gain or lose by doing so 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998)’. In contrast, within community thinking one primarily relates 
to the second approach. When adopting the assumptions of one approach, it is quite hard to 
understand the assumptions underlying the other approach. The phenomenon of an 
altruistic community is hard to explain within transaction costs thinking and vice versa. 
Nevertheless, the dynamics of knowledge sharing cannot be understood nor explained 
either by solely altruistic motives nor by solely motives of self-interest. Additional 
approaches, relational structures are required in order to understand those parts of 
knowledge sharing behavior that remains unexplained so far.  
 
 
3. Different models of social relations 
 
 The relation models theory of Fiske (Fiske, 1991; Fiske, 1992) claims that people are 
fundamentally sociable. They generally organize their social life in terms of their relations 
with other people. In general people seek to create, sustain, and repair social relationships 
because the relationships themselves are subjectively imperative, intrinsically satisfying, 
and significant. The relation models theory integrates the work of the major social theorists 
and builds on a synthesis of empirical studies across the social sciences, including 
anthropological fieldwork. From an exhaustive review of the major thinking on 
relationships in sociology (such as Blau, 1964; Buber, 1987; Durkheim, 1966; Tönnies, 
1988; Weber, 1975), social anthropology (such as Malinowski, 1961; Polanyi, 1957; 
Salins, 1965; Udy, 1959) and social psychology (such as Clark & Mills, 1979; Krech & 
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Crutchfield, 1965; Leary, 1957; Piaget, 1973), Fiske argues for the existence of four 
fundamental forms of human relationships: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality 
matching and market pricing. The four social structures are manifestations of elementary 
mental models (schemata). Each of the relational models is now briefly described. Table 1 
summarizes some of the major postulations of the relation models theory. 
 Communal sharing relationships (CS) are based on a conception of some bounded 
group of people as equivalent and undifferentiated. In this kind of relationship, the 
members of a group or dyad treat each other as all the same, focusing on commonalities 
and disregarding distinct individual identities. People in a CS relationship often think of 
themselves as sharing some common substance (e.g., family ties), and hence think that it is 
natural to be relatively kind and altruistic to people of their own kind. Close kinship ties 
usually involve a major CS component, as does intense love; ethical and national identities 
and even minimal groups are more attenuated forms of CS. When people are thinking in 
terms of equivalence relations, they tend to regard the equivalence class to which they 
themselves belong as better than others, and to favor it. 
 Authority ranking relationships (AR) are based on a model of asymmetry among people 
who are linearly ordered along some hierarchical social dimension. People higher in rank 
have prestige, prerogatives, and privileges that their inferiors lack, but subordinates are 
often entitled to protection and pastoral care. Authorities often control some aspects of 
their subordinates’ actions. Relationships between people of different ranks in the military 
are predominantly governed by this model, as are relations across generations and between 
genders in many traditional societies. Although, in principle, in any society or situation, 
people could be ranked in different hierarchies according to innumerable different status-
relevant features, in practice, people tend to reduce these factors to a single linear ordering. 
When people are thinking in terms of such linearly ordered structures, they treat higher 
ranks as better. 
 Equality matching relationships (EM) are based on a model of even balance and one-
for-one correspondence, as in turn taking, egalitarian distributive justice, in-kind 
reciprocity, tot-for-tat retaliation, eye-for-an-eye revenge, or compensation by equal 
replacement. People are primarily concerned about whether an EM relationship is 
balanced, and keep track of how far out of balance it is. The idea is that each person is 
entitled to the same amount as each other person in the relationship, and that the direction 
and magnitude of an imbalance are meaningful. Colleagues who are not intimate often 
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interact on this basis: they know how far from equality they are, and what they would need 
to do to even things up. People value equality and strongly prefer having at least as much 
as their partners in an EM relationship. 
 
Table 1 Postulations of relation models theory 
• People are fundamentally sociable; they generally organize their social life in terms 
of their relations with other people. 
• People use just four relational models (communal sharing, authority ranking, 
equality matching and market pricing) to generate, understand, coordinate and 
evaluate these social relationships; the four social structures are manifestations of 
elementary mental models (schemata). 
• These models are autonomous, distinct structures, not dimensions; there is no 
continuum of intermediate forms. 
• People find each of the models of relationships intrinsically satisfying for its own 
sake. There is typically an extremely high degree of consensus among interacting 
actors about what model is, and should be operative. 
• People believe that they should adhere to the models, and insist that others 
conform to the four models as well.  
• Social conflicts often occur when people are perceived to be profoundly violating 
the elementary relationships. 
• The residual cases not governed by any of these four models are asocial 
interactions, in which people use other people purely as a means to some ulterior 
end, or null interactions, in which people ignore each other’s conceptions, goals 
and standards entirely. 
• People commonly string the relational models together and nest them 
hierarchically in various phases of an interaction or in distinct activities of an 
organization.  
• Relations and operations that are socially significant in one relational structure may 
not be meaningful in certain others. 
• People in different societies commonly use different models and combinations of 
models in any given domain or context. Cultural implementation rules (rules that 
stipulate when each model applies and rules that stipulate how to execute each 
model) are essential for the realization of any model in practice (domain, degree). 
• The four models do not all work equally well in every domain, and each is 
dysfunctional for some purposes in some contexts. 
 (Derived from Fiske 1992) 
 
 Market pricing relationships (MP) are based on a model of proportionality in social 
relationships and people attend to ratios and rates. People in an MP relationship usually 
reduce all the relevant features and components under consideration to a singular value or 
utility metric that allows the comparison of many qualitatively and quantitatively diverse 
factors. People organize their interactions with reference to ratios of this metric, so that 
what matters is how a person stands in proportion to others. Proportions are continuous, 
and can take any value. The most prominent examples of interactions governed by MP are 
those that are oriented towards prices, wages, commissions, rents, interest rates, tithes, 
taxes and all other relationships organized in terms of cost-benefit ratios and rational 
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calculations of efficiency or expected utility. 
 It might seem impossible that just four relational models can explain all complex 
relationships. However, there are four ways in which diversity based on the four models is 
established. First, there are three variables on which each of the four relational models can 
vary. They can vary in intensity, from null (ignoring each other) to total involvement; they 
can vary in the degree to which the participants are relating for the sake of the relationship 
itself or are using each other as means to asocial ends; and they can vary in the formality 
(strictness) with which people observe the standards of whatever model they are using. 
 Second, it is quite rare to find a relationship that draws on only one relational model. 
People commonly use a combination of models, out of which people construct complex 
social relations. For example, colleagues may share office supplies freely with each other 
(CS), work on a task at which one is an expert and imperiously directs the other (AR), 
divide equally the amounts of carpooling rides (EM), and transfer a laptop computer from 
one to the other for a price determined by its utility or exchange value (MP). Thus, each of 
the models is operating simultaneously at different levels of a social relationship. 
 Third, the relational models in use are not static, but might change over time. Several 
theorists have described dynamic sequences of transition in which the dominant form of 
interaction changes from one of the relational models to another. The relationship between 
a given pair of people or among the members of a particular group is assumed to transform 
from MP to EM to CS, or from AR to CS, although sequences may vary. In a society, 
however, most writers suggest a sequence in the opposite direction that is some subset of 
the ordering, CS → AR → EM → MP, usually over historical spans of time (e.g., 
transition from primitive tribe to capitalistic society). 
 The last and most important reason for establishing diversity based on the four models 
is the importance of cultural implementation rules. Cultural implementation rules are rules 
that stipulate when each model applies and rules that stipulate how to execute each model. 
These implication rules are explained after the next section. 
 
 
4. Implications for knowledge sharing 
 
 The previous section has described the four elementary models of social relations. 
Before that, it has been asserted that the dynamics of knowledge sharing can be organized 
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according to these relational models. Since the relation models theory intends to describe 
the fundamental ‘grammar’ of social life rather than focusing on the knowledge sharing 
issue specifically, this section describes how we think that the theory can be specified for 
knowledge sharing. It is explained how we think that each model conceptualizes 
knowledge and how each model determines the principles behind knowledge sharing.  
 Within CS relationships, knowledge is perceived as a common resource, rather than as 
one’s individual property. Knowledge is not personally marked, since it belongs to the 
whole group. Knowledge is freely shared among people belonging to the same group or 
dyad, following the idea ‘what’s mine is yours’. Although knowledge is being shared 
without expecting anything particular in return, it is still a matter of reciprocity. The 
underlying assumption of people sharing knowledge within a CS relationship is that they 
expect an unspecified favor from an unspecified group member within an unspecified time 
span in return (see table 3). In exchange theory this is referred to as generalized reciprocity 
(Mauss, 1925). By sharing knowledge within the group or dyad one ‘receives’ the potential 
helpfulness of the group in future. The motivation for sharing knowledge is based on 
intimacy. Knowledge is shared because one thinks that someone else might need it or 
because someone asks for it. There are no hidden motives for (not) sharing knowledge. The 
only reason for not sharing knowledge is when one is not capable of sharing or when the 
desirability for sharing knowledge is unknown.  
 In order to share knowledge according to CS principles, a bounded group sharing some 
common substance (e.g. kinship) is required. It is important to realize that this common 
substance between people can be based on different objects of, or different grounds for 
cohesion (Lammers, 1964). Although CS is frequently not the dominant structure for 
sharing knowledge organization-wide (e.g. object is the university), there might exist some 
subsets within the organization where knowledge is being shared based on CS (e.g. object 
is department within the university). Furthermore, people might share knowledge with 
others according to CS since they feel connected with them based on shared ideological 
objectives (ideal cohesion, e.g. within a political movement), based on shared activities 
(instrumental cohesion, like between academic staff) or based on solidarity (social 
cohesion, like fine working environment).  
 Within AR relationships knowledge is perceived as a means to display rank differences, 
whether rank is based on e.g. formal power, expertise or age. The higher a person’s rank, 
the better access to better knowledge. A person higher in rank who shares knowledge with 
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someone lower in rank demonstrates his nobility and largesse and expects to get authority 
or status in return (see table 3). A subordinate shares knowledge because either he has to or 
because he wants to chum up with his superior. In both cases the subordinate can expect a 
kind of ‘pastoral care’ in return. In this respect knowledge sharing is motivated by power 
differences. People are less or not willing to share knowledge when it can change their 
balance of power negatively. ‘Negative’ knowledge is frequently withhold by window 
dressing behavior and a knowledge overload may originate from largesse and sweet-talk.  
 Within EM relationships knowledge is perceived as a means of leveling out knowledge 
sharing efforts. The principle behind knowledge sharing within an EM relation is based on 
the exchange of knowledge for similar knowledge (see table 3). Knowledge is being shared 
because someone else has shared something similar before or because one expects 
something similar in return. It is the desire for equality that motivates knowledge sharing. 
In this respect one can morally obliged a person to share something in return by sharing 
knowledge oneself. People are less or not willing to share knowledge when nothing similar 
can be shared in return within a reasonable time span. 
 Within MP relationships knowledge is perceived as a commodity which has a value and 
can be traded. Knowledge is being shared because one receives a compensation for it (not 
being similar knowledge or status). People are motivated to share knowledge by 
achievement. When the perceived compensation is not high enough, people are less or not 
willing to share knowledge. In appendix 1 the implications of the four relational models for 
understanding knowledge sharing are summarized. 
 Let’s illustrate the different knowledge sharing principles for professional knowledge 
workers. Whereas the university is expected to be a place where knowledge is being shared 
freely, following the rules of CS, the reality demonstrates that the CS mechanism is hardly 
present within universities. Of course, scientists are very eager to share their knowledge 
with other people from the academic community, but only when they are being rewarded 
for it by prestige (AR) or money (MP). So sharing ideas through scientific publications 
associated with author names is common practice, just like contributing to a lucrative 
publication. However, unbridledly sharing knowledge with colleagues in the pre-
publication phase (CS) is less obvious to occur. In the day-to-day activities of academics, 
knowledge is commonly shared with colleagues according to EM principles. Only when 
they acquire valuable knowledge from colleagues, they will share similar knowledge with 
them (and vice versa). Regularly, academics feel more cohesiveness with the peers who are 
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working on their own research topic than with people from unrelated departments or with 
the entire university. A similar line of reasoning exists for ambitious professional consul-
tants. Since these knowledge workers frequently feel more connected with the consulting 
profession and their own career than with the consulting firm they are working for 
temporally, they like to receive intellectual recognition for their own work (AR) more 
often than a financial reward (MP). In contrast with the academics, consultants are 
frequently not personally rewarded for their intellectual effort. The intellectual outcome is 
considered to be ‘owned’ by the whole organization (CS) and therefore the company name 
is connected to it rather than the name of the consultant who created it. Some consultancy 
firms have succeeded to create an intensive ideal cohesiveness, resulting in CS practices of 
knowledge sharing.  
  
 
5. Cultural implementation rules 
 
 Each of the four elementary models can be realized only in some culture-specific 
manner. There are no culture-free implementations of the models. Each model leaves open 
a number of parameters that require some determinant setting. Within CS relationships one 
have to determine what is shared collectively and what is not (e.g., goods or thoughts). 
Within AR relationships the important question is whether people are ranked by age, 
gender, race, inheritance of or succession to office, or various kinds of achieved status. 
Questions like ‘what counts as equal?’ and ‘what is appropriate delay before recipro-
Table 2 Models of social relations with their implications for knowledge sharing 
 Communal Sharing 1) Authority Ranking 1) Equality Matching 1) Market Pricing 1) 
Object of exchange 
for sharing 
knowledge 
None or nothing 
specified 
Respect, loyalty, 
authority or pastoral 
care, loyalty 
Similar knowledge Specified value 
Timing of reciprocity No or unspecified Non-specific Implicitly specified in (short) future 
Direct or specified in 
future 
Breakdown2) KS with outsiders Evaporation of power base Violation of equality Exploiting the other 
Narrative 
“We just all try to do 
what we can, and that’s 
different for everybody” 
“ It is not a matter of 
free will, I have to share 
my knowledge” 
“Now it is my turn to 
coach the newcomer” 
“ I owe you one” 
“As long as they are 
paying me enough for 
my expertise, I will 
share my knowledge” 
1)  This relational model occurs both in a dyadic version and in a generalized version. 
2)  Obviously breakdowns occur within all models when the timing is violated or when the object of exchange is inaccurate. 
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cating?’ need to be answered within EM relationships. MP relationships have to determine 
how prices are set, what counts as an offer of sale or bid to buy and when one can 
acceptably withdraw from an agreement. Furthermore, people in different societies 
commonly use different models and combinations of models in any given domain or 
context. Within many western countries the husband-wife relationship, for example, is 
primarily based on EM, whereas other cultures consider it as normal that the husband 
dominates his wife (AR). Relations and operations that are socially significant in one 
relational structure may not be meaningful in certain others. For example, within a CS 
mindset the idea of private ownership has no meaning at all, whereas within a MP mindset 
it is hard to understand that people share goods free of charge. 
 
International
National
Industry
Organizational
Individual 1 Individual 2
Individual
Group
Knowledge sharing
Sub-
organizational
National
Industry
Organizational
Individual
Group
Sub-
organizational
Social relation
 
Figure 1 Cultural implementation rules from different contextual levels of analysis 
influencing the social relation and consequently the knowledge sharing process 
 
 Cultural implementation rules are determined by a mix of influences from different 
kinds of cultures, like group culture, organization culture and national culture. Figure 1 
illustrates these different contextual levels as encompassing circles. Two interacting 
individuals establish a social relation, as is depicted by the dark gray area in figure 1. The 
cultural implementation rules determine what model of social relation is in use and how it 
is operating. The knowledge sharing process is, besides influencing individual, 
organizational and knowledge factors, consequently modeled according to the relational 
model in use. 
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 This section will end with presenting a research model about the factors influencing the 
knowledge sharing process. The numbers between brackets refer to the relations as 
depicted in figure 2. Till so far it has been argued that the different models of social 
relations determine the mechanisms behind knowledge sharing processes (1 & 2) and that 
cultural implementation rules are essential for the realization of any relational model in 
practice (3 & 4). Now it is described how the knowledge sharing process is directly 
influenced by the characteristics of knowledge and technology, determining what is being 
shared and how (5 & 6) and by the characteristics of the activity with its division of labor 
influencing the need for sharing knowledge (7 & 8).   
 
Relational
Model
Knowledge
Sharing
Organizational setting
Activity & Division of Labor
Implementation
Rules
Knowledge & Technology
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2
3
4
9 10 5 6
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Figure 2 Conceptual model of determining factors on knowledge sharing 
 
 The nature of knowledge highly determines how it is being shared, or should be shared 
(5). Abstract and uncodified knowledge should be shared differently, for example, than 
knowledge that is concrete and codified (Boisot, 1995). Conversely, by adopting one 
particular way of sharing knowledge (e.g., lecturing, workshop, reading), the variety of 
knowledge that can be shared is limited accordingly (6). A similar line of reasoning is valid 
for the technology being used for sharing knowledge. The media richness (Daft & Lengel, 
1984) and functionality of a technology determines the kind of knowledge that can be 
shared (5) and vice versa (6). 
 The nature of the activity determines the need for knowledge sharing and to some extent 
the nature of the knowledge (7). Knowledge (sharing) within a R&D department is 
different from knowledge (sharing) along an assembly line. A similar line of reasoning is 
valid for the division of labor that accompanies the activity. A craftsman who creates a 
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product all by himself does not need to share knowledge, whereas a team of specialists 
working together on complex products do (7). The more the work of the actors involved 
depend on one another, the greater the need for sharing knowledge. Conversely, by sharing 
knowledge in a particular way over time, an activity or division of labor may be 
established or altered (8). 
 The described factors are influenced by or influence the knowledge sharing process 
directly, without taking its social nature into account. By including the relational models as 
an extra (intermediating) factor, this deficiency can be overcome. Figure 2 illustrates that 
besides the cultural implementation rules, knowledge, technology, activity and division of 
labor influence what relational model is in use. In this respect they can be considered to 
contribute to the implementation rules themselves. 
 When knowledge is specific and uncodified, it is almost impossible to share it according 
to MP principles, whereas knowledge that is highly abstract and codified is less obvious to 
take place according to CS (9). Conversely, when operating according to a particular 
relational model, only knowledge can be shared that fits in this model (10). The effort to 
acquire knowledge also determines the relational model to be used (9). ‘Low profile’ 
knowledge like knowing how to use the coffee machine is likely to take place according 
CS, whereas an electronic presentation about a specific subject is more likely to take place 
according to EM or MP. Finally, not all relational models are suitable for all types of work 
(11 & 12). These relations are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
6. Different organizational settings 
 
 Till so far the relational models have been described primarily as the mechanisms 
behind knowledge sharing between individuals. One can usually generalize such a 
relationship towards one dominant model of social relations. The relation between a 
husband and wife, for example, might be primarily based on EM, even when they act 
according to the other models as well. However, the models can also be used to delineate 
the knowledge sharing mechanisms within organizational settings. After all, organizational 
actors are embedded within a network of social relations. When the majority of actors 
within an organizational setting is sharing knowledge according to one particular relational 
model, the organizational setting can be typified by that dominant model of social 
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relations. In this respect, the four models can be seen as different completions of an 
infoculture (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996) and in this respect specify this rather abstract 
theoretical notion. Based on a process of institutionalization not only relationships and 
organizational settings can be typified by one dominant relational model, but also a country 
or even a society. Whereas many Western countries are inclined towards MP thinking, for 
example, many countries from the Middle East are more based on AR.  
 Lets now focus on the significance of the relational models at the level of organizational 
settings. Different organizational settings could be characterized according to different 
dominant relational models. The assumptions underlying a community of practice, for 
example, are frequently based on CS. In a similar way one might argue that people in a 
formal work group interrelate primarily according to AR and that project members their 
relationships are based on MP. Partly this can be explained by the time scope of the 
different organizational settings. The more often people interact, the longer the relationship 
endures, and the greater the number and diversity of domains in which they interact, the 
less likely they are to use MP and the more likely they are to relate in a CS mode; EM is in 
between (Fiske, 1991). 
 However, even though one can make generalizations about the relational model in use 
in an organizational setting, one always needs to realize that within such an organizational 
setting people interact according to the other models as well. Table 3 illustrates this by 
differentiating different relational models at the interaction level within a particular 
relational model at the organizational level (ellipse). Although there might be one 
relational model which is dominant in a particular organizational setting, it is not the 
organizational setting per se that determines according to what relational model knowledge 
is being shared. For example, even when two collaborating project teams are characterized 
by MP, their linking pins (individuals of both organizations who embody the collaboration) 
may share knowledge according to different social mechanisms. 
 Although it is possible to use any of the four models to organize any aspect of social 
relations, some relational models are more obviously to occur in particular situations. For 
example, work organized along CS lines lacks the long-term productive potential 
characteristic of division of labor based on differentiated complementarity. Whereas EM is 
widely used as a means of obtaining supplementary labor at times of peak demand or of 
tasks that require massed labor, it is never the primary mode of organizing the core group 
for the entire cycle of production. This is probably because a complete cycle of production 
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can rarely be broken down into tasks that are all the same, and because often there is no 
great functional advantage in balanced reciprocal exchange of the same task. Market 
systems governed by prices can be the most efficient mechanism for organizing large-scale 
production and exchange. In part this is because MP facilitates division of labor and 
technical specialization, and in part because of its emergent property of conveying 
information about utilities and costs, permitting the use of this information to guide 
allocation decisions. On the other hand, many kinds of public goods cannot be produced 
and allocated by MP alone. Thus, the four models of human relations are  dysfunctional for 
some purposes in some contexts. Furthermore, they do not work equally well in every 
domain. Let’s take a decision making process as an example. Within CS decision-making 
is based on seeking consensus, within AR relations on authoritative fiat, within EM 
relations on one-person one vote and within MP relations on rational cost benefit analysis. 
When quick decision-making is required, AR is more appropriate than CS, since this last 
model is cumbersome and time consuming. 
 
Table 3 Combining relational models at organizational and interaction level 
Organizational level  
CS AR EM MP 
CS   
   
AR   
   
EM   
   
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
le
ve
l 
MP   
   
 
 
7. Conflicting models of social relations 
 
 Hitherto, it has been presumed that interacting individuals are operating according to the 
same relational model and that the assumptions underlying a technology are in line with 
the relational model of its user. However, in practice the distinctness of the relational 
models is not always assured, resulting in social conflicts or dysfunctional technologies. In 
this section both situations are addressed.  
 Lets reconsider the development of knowledge systems in order to share best practices 
as described in textbox 1 (A similar argument can be made about the implementation of 
communities as described in textbox 2). The rationale behind the design of a knowledge 
  18
system is based on CS. Knowledge is considered to be a pooled resource that is accessible 
by every one and knowledge is considered to be freely shared with others where possible. 
When the people involved do actually interrelate according to the model of CS, then there 
is no problem. However, in situations where there exists a difference between the assumed 
mechanism behind the technology and the actual relational model in use, problems might 
occur. For example, when people’s relation is based on AR, they might have difficulties 
with using a technology that is based on CS. Since, information is accessible by everybody 
including one’s superiors, they avoid the knowledge system and share their ideas 
informally through other media. People do not want to be adjudicated on the basis of some 
informal premature documents they have put in the system. People acting upon EM have 
other reasons for (not) contributing to knowledge systems. A frequently expressed 
argument is that ‘people do not want to bring more than they get’. Especially employees 
who have no intention to remain in an organization, for example, do not value the 
importance of retaining experiences for future use by their colleagues. People whose 
relation is based on MP only contribute to the system when they receive an appropriate 
reward for it, and therefore do not fit the CS assumptions.  
 Different ways can be followed to solve these kinds of problems. One can try to change 
the existing relational model of the user in order to fit the technology to be used, one can 
try to redesign the existing technology in order to fit the relational model of its user, or a 
combination of both. The first situation requires a change of culture, which is a time-
consuming process, whereas the second situation requires a fundamental reconsideration 
about the functionalities of the technology. Obviously, in practice it is not an either or 
choice, but a combination of both. Several technical adjustments of the knowledge system 
can be proposed. The problem within an AR relation might be solved by implementing a 
double layer structure in the knowledge system; only the final content is made accessible 
by everybody, while the rest is only accessible by colleagues of the project team (Ciborra 
& Patriotta, 1996). In the EM situation, for example, one could redesign the technology in 
such a way that people can only consult the knowledge system when they also contribute 
something. In a MP situation people might be stimulated to contribute to the system by 
providing financial bonuses. These suggestions for changing the technology should be 
accompanied by an appropriate change of the relational model (infoculture) in use. Thus, 
reward systems, supporting technologies, organizational hierarchies needs to be in line 
with the relational models in use and vice versa. It is useless, for example, to reward 
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people according to MP when they relate to one another based on AR. Many knowledge 
workers who have achieved a minimum level of income are more sensitive to intellectual 
acknowledgement than to additional financial rewards. 
 A second type op conflicts can occur when people have different interpretations of their 
relationship. A recognizable conflict in organizational settings is the disturbed relation 
between an employee from the IT helpdesk and a needy manager from another department. 
Both individuals might think that their relation is based on AR. The IT-er has a technical 
expertise that the manager is lacking and the manager has a formal power that supersedes 
the influence of the IT-er. Thus, the variable on which the hierarchy is based is different. 
Both are acting and sharing knowledge as if they are the higher in rank, ending in a social 
conflict. The result is that both evaluate the others behavior as inappropriate and both 
experience a lack of understanding. Similar conflicts occur between young just graduated 
academics and grown old senior employees. 
 Let’s consider another example where one person thinks that his relation with someone 
else is based on EM. When this person has shared knowledge with the other and this 
person does not receive any expected similar knowledge in return with an appropriate 
delay, a social conflict might occur. This social conflict can be resolved in several ways. 
The person might continue sharing knowledge with that person, so that the relationship 
shifts from an EM to an AR model. Due to the imbalance of knowledge, the person 
implicitly develops a kind of authority or status. Or the person can be inclined not to share 
any knowledge with that person anymore in future. Additional knowledge needs to be 
shared in order to resolve the conflicts. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 Knowledge sharing is considered to be a fundamentally social process, where two or 
more actors interrelate with one another. There are several aspects of the knowledge 
sharing process which are not yet fully understood. One important explanation for this is 
that current thought about knowledge sharing has been guided largely by one model of 
social relations, whether this is for example one of altruism or one of rational cost benefit 
analysis. The relation models theory of Fiske distinguishes four elementary models of 
social relations that are assumed to apply for the knowledge sharing process as well. 
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Consequently it has been argued that knowledge is being shared differently within each of 
the four relational models. Cultural implementation rules determine when each model 
applies and how each model is executed.  
 It has been described how the nature of the knowledge being shared and the technology 
being used, together with the nature of an activity with its division of labor influence the 
relational model and consequently the knowledge sharing process as well. Some relational 
models do occur more frequently in particular organizational settings than others. 
However, it is not the organizational setting itself that determines how and if knowledge is 
being shared, but the different relationships within the organizational setting. When there is 
a difference between the relational model being actually in use and the relational model 
people think that is in place, social conflicts may occur. 
 In order to really understand knowledge sharing, one need to know according to what 
model knowledge is being shared. Consequently, one can better design technologies that 
support knowledge sharing and design the structure of organizational settings. On the other 
hand, by knowing the assumptions about the social relations underlying the technical and 
organizational infrastructure, one can better understand why knowledge is or is not being 
shared. 
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APPENDIX 1 Knowledge sharing according to different models of social relations 
 
 Communal Sharing Authority Ranking Equality Matching Market Pricing 
How is knowledge 
being perceived? 
As a common 
resource, rather than 
as one’s individual 
property. Knowledge 
is not ‘marked’. 
As a means to display 
one’s superiority; 
‘Knowledge is power’. 
As a means of 
exchange for other 
knowledge. 
As a commodity which 
has a value and can 
be traded. 
What are the 
implications of this 
perception for the 
knowledge sharing 
process? 
Knowledge is freely 
shared among people 
belonging to the same 
group; ‘What’s mine is 
yours’. 
By sharing knowledge 
one can demonstrate 
one’s nobility and 
largesse. The higher a 
person’s rank, the 
better access to better 
knowledge. 
The knowledge 
sharing process 
becomes dependent 
on similar knowledge 
sharing processes 
from the past and/ or 
in the future. 
The knowledge 
sharing process 
becomes dependent 
on the value of the 
knowledge. 
Why is knowledge 
being shared? 
(push vs. pull) 
Because one thinks 
that someone else 
might need it; because 
someone asks for it; 
Intimacy motivation. 
Because it is 
requested by someone 
in a higher rank; 
because the superior 
has to share it. Power 
motivation. 
Because someone 
else has shared 
something similar 
before; because one 
expects something in 
return. 
Desire for equality. 
Because one receives 
a compensation for it 
(not something 
similar). Achievement 
motivation. 
When might 
knowledge not being 
shared even though it 
is desirable? 
When one is not 
capable of sharing it or 
when the desirability is 
unknown. 
When it can change 
the balance of power. 
When nothing similar 
can be shared in 
return within a 
reasonable time span. 
When the perceived 
compensation is not 
high enough. 
What are hidden 
motives for (not) 
sharing knowledge? 
No hidden motives. ‘Negative’ knowledge 
is withhold; window 
dressing. Knowledge 
overload may originate 
from largesse and 
sweet-talk. 
By sharing knowledge 
with someone, one 
can morally obliged 
this person to share 
something in return. 
By sharing knowledge 
below the market 
value, one might 
create moral 
commitment. 
How are problems 
resulting from 
knowledge sharing 
being solved? 
By seeking 
consensus. 
By authoritative fiat. By one-person, one 
vote. 
By rational cost benefit 
analysis. 
By who is knowledge 
being shared? 
By kinship, minimal 
groups, national 
identities (knowledge 
is not being shared 
with outsiders 
obviously). 
By people with 
different hierarchical 
positions (ranks). 
By people at the same 
horizontal or vertical 
position in the division 
of labor. 
By the people who 
receive and provide 
the compensation. 
With what emotion is 
knowledge being 
shared? 
It goes without saying, 
based on idealism. 
Mostly not 
spontaneous but 
based on sense of 
duty. 
Unproblematic as long 
as the time span 
between the return is 
not too long. 
Unproblematic as long 
as the compensation is 
appropriate. 
What moment is 
knowledge being 
shared? 
Any time when 
needed. 
Immediately when the 
superior requests it 
and otherwise when 
he has time. 
When there is a 
(potential) mismatch in 
sharing. 
When the 
compensation is high 
enough. 
How is knowledge 
being shared? 
Divers ways, but in a 
personal way. 
Divers ways 
(brief and short). 
In a similar way as 
before or as expected 
in future. 
In a way it is 
demanded. 
Examples of 
knowledge that is 
typically being shared 
In principle everything. Factual knowledge. Personal background 
stories. 
Functional expertise. 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX II  Manifestations and features of four elementary relational models 
(Derived from Fiske 1992; p. 694) 
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or
di
na
te
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
le
ss
 a
nd
 g
et
 in
fe
rio
r i
te
m
s,
 o
fte
n 
w
ha
t 
is
 le
ft 
ov
er
. 
N
ob
le
ss
e 
ob
lig
e:
 S
up
er
io
rs
 g
iv
e 
be
ne
fic
en
tly
, d
em
on
st
ra
tin
g 
th
ei
r 
no
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
la
rg
es
se
. S
ub
or
di
na
te
 
re
ci
pi
en
ts
 o
f g
ift
s 
ar
e 
ho
no
re
d 
an
d 
be
ho
ld
en
. 
Su
pe
rio
rs
 d
ire
ct
 a
nd
 c
on
tro
l t
he
 w
or
k 
of
 s
ub
or
di
na
te
s,
 w
hi
le
 o
fte
n 
do
in
g 
le
ss
 o
f t
he
 a
rd
uo
us
 o
r m
en
ia
l l
ab
or
. 
Su
pe
rio
rs
 c
on
tro
l p
ro
du
ct
 o
f 
su
bo
rd
in
at
es
’ l
ab
or
. 
Pr
es
tig
e 
ite
m
s 
an
d 
em
bl
em
s 
of
 ra
nk
. 
C
on
sp
ic
uo
us
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
to
 d
is
pl
ay
 
su
pe
rio
rit
y.
 C
on
ve
rs
el
y,
 s
um
pt
ua
ry
 
la
w
s 
th
at
 fo
rb
id
 in
fe
rio
rs
 to
 o
w
n 
th
es
e 
ite
m
s.
 
D
om
ai
n,
 s
ov
er
ei
gn
 re
al
m
, p
er
so
na
l 
do
m
in
io
n,
 fi
ef
, o
r e
st
at
e.
 
C
om
m
un
al
 s
ha
rin
g 
Pe
op
le
 g
iv
e 
w
ha
t t
he
y 
ca
n 
an
d 
fre
el
y 
ta
ke
 w
ha
t t
he
y 
ne
ed
 fr
om
 p
oo
le
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 W
ha
t y
ou
 g
et
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
de
pe
nd
 o
n 
w
ha
t y
ou
 c
on
tri
bu
te
, o
nl
y 
on
 b
el
on
gi
ng
 to
 th
e 
gr
ou
p.
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 u
se
 o
f r
es
ou
rc
es
 re
ga
rd
ed
 
as
 a
 c
om
m
on
s,
 w
ith
ou
t r
eg
ar
d 
fo
r 
ho
w
 m
uc
h 
an
y 
on
e 
pe
rs
on
 u
se
s;
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 b
el
on
gs
 to
 a
ll 
to
ge
th
er
. 
In
di
vi
du
al
 s
ha
re
s 
an
d 
pr
op
er
ty
 a
re
 n
ot
 
m
ar
ke
d.
 
Ev
er
yo
ne
 g
iv
es
 w
ha
t t
he
y 
ha
ve
, 
w
ith
ou
t k
ee
pi
ng
 tr
ac
k 
of
 w
ha
t 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
co
nt
rib
ut
e.
 “W
ha
t’s
 m
in
e 
is
 
yo
ur
s.
” 
Ev
er
yo
ne
 p
itc
he
s 
in
 a
nd
 d
oe
s 
w
ha
t 
he
 o
r s
he
 c
an
, w
ith
ou
t a
ny
on
e 
ke
ep
in
g 
tra
ck
 o
f i
np
ut
s.
 T
as
ks
 a
re
 
tre
at
ed
 a
s 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 
th
e 
gr
ou
p 
w
ith
ou
t d
iv
id
in
g 
th
e 
jo
b 
or
 
as
si
gn
in
g 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
as
si
gn
m
en
ts
. 
H
ei
rlo
om
s,
 k
ee
ps
ak
es
, s
ac
re
d 
re
lic
ts
 
th
at
 a
re
 m
et
on
ym
ic
 li
nk
s 
to
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ith
 w
ho
m
 a
 p
er
so
n 
id
en
tif
ie
s.
 
M
ot
he
rla
nd
 o
r h
om
el
an
d,
 d
ef
in
in
g 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
et
hn
ic
 id
en
tit
y.
 N
at
al
 a
nd
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
an
ce
st
or
s 
an
d 
 h
el
d 
in
 tr
us
t f
or
 p
os
te
rit
y.
 L
an
d 
us
ed
 
co
rp
or
at
el
y 
as
 a
 c
om
m
on
s.
 
D
om
ai
ns
 
R
ec
ip
ro
ca
l 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
D
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
C
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
W
or
k 
M
ea
ni
ng
  
of
 th
in
gs
 
O
rie
nt
at
io
ns
 
to
 la
nd
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M
ar
ke
t p
ric
in
g 
C
al
cu
lu
s 
of
 ra
te
s 
of
 in
te
re
st
, r
et
ur
n,
 
pa
y,
 o
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 p
er
 u
ni
t o
f t
im
e.
 
C
on
ce
rn
 w
ith
 e
ffi
ci
en
t u
se
 o
f t
im
e,
 
sp
en
di
ng
 it
 e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y,
 a
nd
 w
ith
 th
e 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 c
os
t o
f w
as
te
d 
tim
e.
 
M
ar
ke
t d
ec
id
es
, g
ov
er
ne
d 
by
 s
up
pl
y 
an
d 
de
m
an
d 
or
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
ut
ilit
ie
s.
 
Al
so
 ra
tio
na
l c
os
t a
nd
 b
en
ef
it 
an
al
ys
is
. 
C
os
t a
nd
 b
en
ef
it 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 –
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
sp
ec
ify
in
g 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 
pa
ym
en
ts
, b
on
us
es
, a
nd
 p
en
al
tie
s.
 
Ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 o
ve
r t
er
m
s 
of
 e
xc
ha
ng
e.
 
M
ar
ke
t m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n.
 O
ffe
rin
g 
a 
“s
pe
ci
al
 d
ea
l” 
or
 a
 b
ar
ga
in
: a
pp
ar
en
t 
sc
ar
ci
ty
 a
nd
 ti
m
e 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 m
ay
 
m
ov
e 
pe
op
le
 to
 a
ct
. 
C
or
po
ra
tio
ns
, l
ab
or
 u
ni
on
s,
 s
to
ck
 
m
ar
ke
ts
 a
nd
 c
om
m
od
ity
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
. 
Al
so
, b
ur
ea
uc
ra
cy
 w
ith
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
or
ie
nt
ed
 to
 p
ra
gm
at
ic
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
. 
Se
lf 
de
fin
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 o
cc
up
at
io
n 
or
 
ec
on
om
ic
 ro
le
: h
ow
 o
ne
 e
ar
ns
 a
 
liv
in
g.
 Id
en
tit
y 
a 
pr
od
uc
t o
f 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
ria
l s
uc
ce
ss
 o
r f
ai
lu
re
. 
Ac
hi
ev
em
en
t m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
Ab
st
ra
ct
, u
ni
ve
rs
al
, r
at
io
na
l p
rin
ci
pl
es
 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
ut
ilit
ar
ia
n 
cr
ite
rio
n 
of
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
st
 g
oo
d 
fo
r t
he
 g
re
at
es
t n
um
be
r 
(s
in
ce
 th
is
 c
al
cu
lu
s 
re
qu
ire
s 
a 
ra
tio
 
m
et
ric
 fo
r a
ss
es
si
ng
 a
ll 
co
st
s 
an
d 
be
ne
fit
s)
. 
Eq
ua
lit
y 
m
at
ch
in
g 
O
sc
illa
tio
n 
of
 tu
rn
s,
 o
f h
os
tin
g,
 o
r 
ot
he
r r
ec
ip
ro
ca
tio
n 
at
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 
fre
qu
en
cy
. S
yn
ch
ro
ny
 o
f a
ct
io
n 
or
 
al
ig
nm
en
t o
f i
nt
er
va
ls
 to
 e
qu
at
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s’
 e
ffo
rts
 o
r o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s.
 
O
ne
-p
er
so
n,
 o
ne
-v
ot
e 
el
ec
tio
n.
 
Ev
er
yo
ne
 h
as
 e
qu
al
 s
ay
. A
ls
o 
ro
ta
tin
g 
of
fic
es
 o
r l
ot
te
ry
. 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
to
 re
tu
rn
 a
 fa
vo
r (
“lo
g 
ro
llin
g”
), 
ta
ki
ng
 tu
rn
s 
de
ci
di
ng
, o
r 
go
in
g 
al
on
g 
to
 c
om
pe
ns
at
e 
ev
en
ly
 o
r 
ke
ep
 th
in
gs
 b
al
an
ce
d.
 
Eq
ua
l-s
ta
tu
s 
pe
er
 g
ro
up
s.
 F
or
 
ex
am
pl
e,
 a
 c
ar
 p
oo
l, 
co
op
er
at
iv
e,
 a
nd
 
ro
ta
tin
g 
cr
ed
it 
as
so
ci
at
io
n.
 
Se
lf 
as
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
bu
t c
o-
eq
ua
l p
ee
r, 
on
 a
 p
ar
 w
ith
 fe
llo
w
s.
 Id
en
tit
y 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
st
ay
in
g 
ev
en
, k
ee
pi
ng
 
up
 w
ith
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
gr
ou
p.
 
D
es
ire
 fo
r e
qu
al
ity
 
Fa
irn
es
s 
as
 s
tri
ct
 e
qu
al
ity
, e
qu
al
 
tre
at
m
en
t, 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
ed
 re
ci
pr
oc
ity
. 
Au
th
or
ity
 ra
nk
in
g 
Se
qu
en
tia
l p
re
ce
de
nc
e 
m
ar
ks
 s
ta
tu
s 
by
 s
er
ia
l o
rd
er
in
g 
of
 a
ct
io
n 
or
 
at
te
nt
io
n 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 ra
nk
. T
em
po
ra
l 
pr
io
rit
y 
to
 s
up
er
io
rs
, o
fte
n 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
by
 a
ge
 o
r s
en
io
rit
y.
 
By
 a
ut
ho
rit
at
iv
e 
fia
t o
r d
eg
re
e.
 W
ill 
of
 
th
e 
le
ad
er
 is
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ch
ai
n 
of
 c
om
m
an
d.
 S
ub
or
di
na
te
s 
ob
ey
 o
rd
er
s.
 
O
be
di
en
ce
 to
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
or
 d
ef
er
en
ce
 
to
 p
re
st
ig
io
us
 le
ad
er
s.
 S
ub
or
di
na
te
s 
di
sp
la
y 
lo
ya
lty
 a
nd
 s
tri
ve
 to
 p
le
as
e 
su
pe
rio
rs
. 
Fo
llo
w
er
s 
of
 a
 c
ha
ris
m
at
ic
 o
r o
th
er
 
le
ad
er
. H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
m
ilit
ar
y)
. 
Se
lf 
as
 re
ve
re
d 
le
ad
er
 o
r l
oy
al
 
fo
llo
w
er
; i
de
nt
ity
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
su
pe
rio
r r
an
k 
an
d 
pr
er
og
at
iv
e,
 o
r 
in
fe
rio
rit
y 
an
d 
se
rv
itu
de
. 
Po
w
er
 m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
W
ha
t s
up
re
m
e 
be
in
g 
co
m
m
an
ds
 is
 
rig
ht
. O
be
di
en
ce
 to
 w
ill 
of
 s
up
er
io
rs
. 
H
et
er
on
om
y,
 c
ha
ris
m
at
ic
 le
gi
tim
at
io
n.
 
C
om
m
un
al
 s
ha
rin
g 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
re
 id
ea
liz
ed
 a
s 
et
er
na
l 
(e
.g
., 
so
lid
ar
ity
 th
at
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
de
sc
en
t o
r c
om
m
on
 o
rig
in
). 
Pe
rp
et
ua
tio
n 
of
 tr
ad
iti
on
, m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 b
y 
re
pl
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
pa
st
. 
G
ro
up
 s
ee
ks
 c
on
se
ns
us
, u
ni
ty
, t
he
 
se
ns
e 
of
 th
e 
gr
ou
p.
 
C
on
fo
rm
ity
: d
es
ire
 to
 b
e 
si
m
ila
r t
o 
ot
he
rs
, t
o 
ag
re
e,
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
 u
na
ni
m
ity
, 
an
d 
no
t s
ta
nd
 o
ut
 a
s 
di
ffe
re
nt
. M
ut
ua
l 
m
od
el
in
g 
an
d 
im
ita
tio
n.
 
Se
ns
e 
of
 u
ni
ty
, s
ol
id
ar
ity
, s
ha
re
d 
su
bs
ta
nc
e 
(e
.g
., 
“b
lo
od
”, 
ki
ns
hi
p)
. 
O
ne
-fo
r-a
ll,
 a
ll-
fo
r-o
ne
. 
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
in
 a
 n
at
ur
al
 k
in
d.
 S
el
f 
de
fin
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 a
nc
es
try
, r
ac
e,
 
et
hn
ic
ity
, c
om
m
on
 o
rig
in
s,
 a
nd
 
co
m
m
on
 fa
te
. I
de
nt
ity
 d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 
cl
os
es
t a
nd
 m
os
t e
nd
ur
in
g 
pe
rs
on
al
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
. 
In
tim
ac
y 
m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
C
ar
in
g,
 k
in
dn
es
s,
 a
ltr
ui
sm
, s
el
fle
ss
 
ge
ne
ro
si
ty
. P
ro
te
ct
in
g 
in
tim
at
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
. 
D
om
ai
ns
  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
of
 
tim
e 
D
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
So
ci
al
 
in
flu
en
ce
 
C
on
st
itu
tio
n 
of
 
gr
ou
ps
 
So
ci
al
 id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
th
e 
re
la
tio
na
l s
el
f 
M
ot
iv
at
io
n 
M
or
al
 
ju
dg
m
en
t a
nd
 
id
eo
lo
gy
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M
ar
ke
t p
ric
in
g 
W
as
 th
is
 a
 re
as
on
ab
le
 e
xp
ec
ta
bl
e 
ris
k 
or
 c
al
cu
la
bl
e 
co
st
 to
 p
ay
 fo
r 
be
ne
fit
s 
so
ug
ht
? 
Is
 th
is
 to
o 
hi
gh
 a
 
pr
ic
e 
to
 p
ay
? 
M
er
ca
nt
ile
 w
ar
s,
 s
la
vi
ng
, e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
of
 w
or
ke
rs
. K
illi
ng
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
or
 p
ro
fit
s.
 R
ob
be
ry
 a
nd
 e
xt
or
tio
n.
 W
ar
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ki
ll 
ra
tio
s.
  
W
ha
t e
nt
iti
es
 m
ay
 b
e 
bo
ug
ht
 a
nd
 
so
ld
? 
(e
.g
., 
se
x?
 d
ru
gs
? 
vo
te
s?
 
pe
op
le
?)
. W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
ra
tio
s 
of
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 h
ow
 d
o 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
at
tri
bu
te
s 
af
fe
ct
 p
ric
es
 (e
.g
., 
ho
w
 
m
an
y 
ho
ur
s 
of
 u
ns
ki
lle
d 
w
ee
ke
nd
 
la
bo
r f
or
 o
ne
 o
ld
 re
d 
ba
nt
am
 h
en
?)
 
W
ha
t c
ou
nt
s 
as
 a
 c
os
t o
r a
 b
en
ef
it 
(in
 
ei
th
er
 m
on
et
ar
y 
or
 u
til
ity
 te
rm
s)
. 
Ab
st
ra
ct
 s
ym
bo
lic
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
(e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 p
re
po
si
tio
na
l l
an
gu
ag
e 
an
d 
ar
ith
m
et
ic
). 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 v
er
ba
l 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 re
fe
rri
ng
 to
 v
al
ue
-
re
le
va
nt
 fe
at
ur
es
; p
rin
te
d 
or
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
pr
ic
e 
lis
ts
; s
ym
bo
lic
al
ly
 c
on
ve
ye
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t c
ur
re
nt
 m
ar
ke
t 
co
nd
iti
on
s.
 
R
at
io
. 
Ar
ch
im
ed
ia
n 
or
de
re
d 
fie
ld
. 
Ad
ap
tiv
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
m
m
od
ity
 e
xc
ha
ng
e.
 
D
ur
in
g 
9t
h  y
ea
r. 
Eq
ua
lit
y 
m
at
ch
in
g 
Fe
el
in
g 
th
at
 m
is
fo
rtu
ne
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
eq
ua
lly
 d
is
tri
bu
te
d:
 “T
hi
ng
s 
ev
en
 o
ut
 
in
 th
e 
lo
ng
 ru
n”
. I
de
a 
th
at
 m
is
fo
rtu
ne
 
ba
la
nc
es
 a
 c
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
 
tra
ns
gr
es
si
on
. 
Ey
e-
fo
r-a
n-
ey
e 
fe
ud
in
g,
 ti
t-f
or
-ta
t 
re
pr
is
al
s.
 R
ev
en
ge
, r
et
al
ia
tio
n.
 
W
ho
 a
nd
 w
ha
t c
ou
nt
s 
as
 e
qu
al
. W
ha
t 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 p
eo
pl
e 
us
e 
fo
r m
at
ch
in
g 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
in
g.
 H
ow
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
iti
at
e 
tu
rn
-ta
ki
ng
. W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
de
la
ys
 b
ef
or
e 
re
ci
pr
oc
at
in
g.
 
C
on
cr
et
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 in
vo
lv
in
g 
ph
ys
ic
al
 m
an
ip
ul
at
io
ns
 o
f t
ok
en
 o
r 
pe
rs
on
s 
so
 a
s 
to
 b
al
an
ce
, m
at
ch
, 
sy
nc
hr
on
iz
e,
 a
lig
n,
 o
r p
la
ce
 th
em
 in
 
on
e-
fo
r-o
ne
 c
or
re
sp
on
de
nc
e.
 
In
te
rv
al
. 
O
rd
er
ed
 A
be
lia
n 
gr
ou
p.
 
“T
it-
fo
r-t
at
” i
n-
ki
nd
 re
ci
pr
oc
ity
 
(e
vo
lu
tio
na
ril
y 
st
ab
le
 s
tra
te
gy
, 
ad
ap
tiv
e 
in
iti
al
ly
, r
es
is
ta
nt
 to
 
in
va
si
on
). 
So
on
 a
fte
r f
ou
rth
 b
irt
hd
ay
. 
Au
th
or
ity
 ra
nk
in
g 
H
av
e 
I a
ng
er
ed
 G
od
? 
D
id
 I 
di
so
be
y 
th
e 
an
ce
st
or
s?
 
W
ar
s 
to
 e
xt
en
d 
po
lit
ic
al
 h
eg
em
on
y.
 
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 fa
il 
to
 a
cc
ep
t 
th
e 
le
gi
tim
ac
y 
of
 p
ol
iti
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
or
 w
ho
 c
om
m
it 
le
se
 m
aj
es
té
. A
ls
o 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
ss
as
si
na
tio
n 
an
d 
ty
ra
nn
ic
id
e.
 
W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 fo
r a
cc
or
di
ng
 
ra
nk
. W
ha
t d
im
en
si
on
s 
m
ar
k 
pr
ec
ed
en
ce
. I
n 
w
ha
t d
om
ai
ns
 m
ay
 
au
th
or
ity
 b
e 
ex
er
ci
se
d.
 
Sp
at
io
te
m
po
ra
l o
rd
er
ed
 a
rra
ys
 (e
.g
., 
w
ho
 is
 in
 fr
on
t, 
w
ho
 c
om
es
 fi
rs
t).
 
D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 (s
iz
e 
of
 
dw
el
lin
g,
 p
er
so
na
l s
pa
ce
); 
pl
ur
al
 
pr
on
ou
ns
 fo
r r
es
pe
ct
. 
O
rd
in
al
. 
Li
ne
ar
 o
rd
er
in
g.
 
Ad
ap
tiv
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 
do
m
in
an
ce
 b
eh
av
io
rs
 in
 a
 li
ne
ar
 
hi
er
ar
ch
y.
 
By
 a
ge
 th
re
e.
 
C
om
m
un
al
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